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Do Socioeconomic Regulations Discriminate 
against Small Firms?* 
TRAN HUU DUNG 
ROBERT PREMUS 
Wright State University 
Dayton, Ohio 
I. Introduction 
Federal procurement laws subject all government contractors and subcontractors to a complex 
maze of what have become known as socioeconomic regulations. Purportedly, these regulations 
are a means by which the government can use its power as a large buyer-sometimes the only 
buyer-to force the business sector to help implement a variety of social policies, such as in- 
creasing employment opportunities for the handicapped and the minorities, raising wage rates 
in some specific industries, timulating small business creation, reducing regional inequalities, 
decreasing national dependence on imports, and numerous others. In all, there are currently no 
fewer than 4,000 provisions of Federal Law and more than 64,000 pages of regulations affecting 
procurement. 
Consider, for instance, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 which, in most respects, is a proto- 
type of 37 major socioeconomic regulations. Aimed at expanding employment opportunities for 
the handicapped, this act requires businesses selling products and services to the Federal govern- 
ment to make "reasonable accommodations," such as job restructuring, physical access, and job 
counseling for the handicapped. Failure to do so could result in the loss of Federal contracts and 
possibly court litigation. 
According to its critics, the Rehabilitation Act unfairly imposes additional costs of hiring 
and training the handicapped workers onto firms participating in the Federal contract market. 
(In fact, the Act does not require an estimate of costs nor an assessment of the ability of firms 
to pay.) Moreover, the critics contend that the socioeconomic regulations place small firms at a 
disadvantage relative to large firms, a consequence that appears to run counter to other economic 
objectives. 
Several reasons have been cited to support this latter contention. First, large firms supply 
unique products to the Federal government. The Stealth bomber, MX missile, Trident submarine, 
and space shuttle are examples of unique products procured from the large business sector. With 
their strong market power, these businesses are in a better position to pass the additional costs 
of hiring the handicapped onto their suppliers, the general taxpayer, or both. Second, large firms 
*An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Southern Economic Association meeting in San Antonio, 
November 1988. We would like to thank Everett White and an anonymous referee for their useful comments and sugges- 
tions. Of course, responsibility for any errors is ours alone. 
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are more likely to be in a position to make better use of the specialized skills of the handicapped. 
Finally, economies of scale in the provision of physical accommodations and supportive services 
to aid the handicapped may be present. Thus, the net per person cost of hiring the handicapped 
is likely to be lower for large firms than it is for smaller firms. 
In contrast o these popular arguments, a survey conducted by the Congressional Joint Eco- 
nomic Committee (JEC) ' provided some limited evidence that small firms may actually benefit 
from socioeconomic regulations. Based upon a 1979-80 questionnaire survey of 2,530 Federal 
contractors, to which 766 companies responded, the JEC study shows that a majority (65%) of 
small firms reported that heir profit margins remained adequate or were actually better than they 
expected prior to entering the procurement market. 
The principal objective of this paper is to subject the issue of a possible small business bias 
resulting from the imposition of socioeconomic regulations to rigorous theoretical analysis. In 
view of the fact that most of the criticisms of these regulations are based on the observation- 
which we believe to be accurate-that he affected industries are typically oligopolistic with high 
entry barriers and firms of unequal sizes, we will focus our attention on this case. It turns out that 
the simpler situation, when firms are atomistic price-takers, is a special case of our model. 
We employ the conjectural variations approach to model oligopolistic interactions. This ap- 
proach has become very popular in the industrial organization literature in recent years2 because 
it allows great flexibility-perfect competition, monopoly, and monopolistic competition can all 
be considered special cases of conjectural variations. Two alternative parameters are chosen as 
proxies for firm size: market share and the degree of economies of scale. 
Several surprising results emerge. First, when factor substitution is possible, some socio- 
economic regulations can actually have consequences diametrically opposed to what is intended. 
Second, it is not necessarily true that these regulations hurt he industry (unless the industry is a 
monopoly or is competitive). And third, even when these regulations lower industry profits, small 
firms could come out ahead, absolutely as well as relatively, provided that the industry is not too 
collusive. 
It must be mentioned, however, that our model does not take into account administration 
and monitoring costs. This omission is relatively harmless as our main intention isnot to compare 
alternative policies which may have different administration a d monitoring costs, but rather to 
pursue the less ambitious task of examining the impact of a typical socioeconomic regulation on 
firms of unequal sizes. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II sets up the basic model using stylized clauses 
of the Rehabilitation Act as examples of socioeconomic regulations. Section III shows how em- 
ployment and output are affected by the regulations. Section IV examines how profits of small 
and large firms are affected in an oligopolistic framework. Results of a numerical simulation for 
various market structures are reported in section V. A summary and implications are presented in 
section VI. 
II. The Basic Model 
Consider an industry consisting of two firms (which could be of unequal sizes) producing a
homogeneous commodity. The analysis can be easily extended to the case of n > 2 firms. Call 
1. See Premus, et al. [7]. This study was partially funded by a grant from the Small Business Administration. 
2. The main references are Dixit [1], Katz and Rosen [3], Perry [6], Seade [9], and Stern [10]. 
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qi the output of firm i (i = 1, 2), Q (=qi + q2) the output of the industry, and P(Q) the inverse 
market demand function, with P' < 0. 
Let qi = F (Ki, Li) be the production function (continuous and twice differentiable, and 
everywhere strictly concave-the latter condition on F ensures atisfaction of second-order con- 
ditions for profit maximization), which is the same for both firms, where Ki is capital and Li is 
labor. Li is measured in efficiency units which, for convenience, are chosen to be equal to one 
man-hour of non-handicapped labor. Suppose that one man-hour of handicapped labor is equiva- 
lent to a man-hour of non-handicapped labor for the particular kind of production in question. 
Thus, 
Li = Ni + aN[, 
where Ni and N[ denote the number of non-handicapped and handicapped workers respectively. 
We assume that a < 1; otherwise there is no reason for the firm to treat handicapped and non- 
handicapped workers differently, even in the absence of regulation. It must be recognized that 
a may be equal or greater than unity in some lines of work. In other words, we focus only on 
situations where handicapped workers are less efficient than non-handicapped workers, without 
suggesting that this is always the case. 
The firm is assumed to maximize its total profit by choosing Ki, Ni, and Nf, subject to the 
regulation according to which (1) no less than a certain fraction (k) of a firm's employment must 
be handicapped; and (2) handicapped and non-handicapped workers must be paid the same wage, 
w per worker per hour. 
Formally, the problem facing the firm i is: 
max PF(Ki, Li) - w (Ni + N[) - rKi (1) 
subject to 
Ni- 
2 k(Ni + N ). (2) 
Assuming that firms choose to satisfy, but not to overfulfill, the handicapped requirement, 
(2) holds with equality. The Lagrangian associated with (1) and (2) is 
Y = PF(Ki,Li) - w(Ni + N[) - rKi - A[N* - k(Ni + N )]. (3) 
Before proceeding with the maximization, ote that a(PF(xl, x2))/axi can be written as: 
a(PF(xl,x2))/axi = PFi + qi[aP/axi], (4) 
where Fi denotes aF(xl, x2)/axi, the marginal products of F. The second term on the right hand 
side of (4) can be rewritten as qivi[aP/aQ]Fi = qiviP'Fi, where vi - dQ/dqi is the conjectural 
(output) variation of firm i. This parameter reflects firm i's belief as to how the industry output 
would change if it changes its output. If firm i is a price taker (as in perfect competition), vi = 0; 
if it adopts Cournot conjecture, vi = 1, and if it is perfectly collusive vi = 2.3 Thus, vi can be 
3. In fact, since conjectural variations may differ across firms (they can be made a function of output as well as 
number of firms), the conjectural variations approach can also be used to model an asymmetric oligopoly such as the 
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interpreted as an index of collusion with a higher vi representing greater collusion and vi E [0, 2] 
being the reasonable range. 
The first-order conditions for profit maximization (making use of the relationship Li = 
Ni + aNi*) are: 
FK(P + qiviP') = r, (5a) 
FN(P + qiviP') = w - Ak, (5b) 
FN*(P + qiviP') = w + A(1 - k), (5c) 
and 
(1 - k)N = kNi. (5d) 
Noting that FN* = aFN = aFL, (5b) and (5c) together imply that A = w(a - 1)/[1 - k(1 
- a)]. Thus, these two conditions can be replaced by a single condition: 
FL(P + qiviP') = w - wk(a - 1)/[1 - k(l - a)], 
or 
= w/[1 - k(l - a)] 2 w. (6) 
When the handicapped requirement is met exactly, an additional efficiency unit of labor, at the 
margin, must be divided between the handicapped and the non-handicapped labor in the ratio 
k/(1 - k). The cost of the marginal efficiency unit of labor, w/[l - k(1 - a)], is the relevant 
price of the composite labor input. Put differently, the handicapped requirement acts as a tax on 
labor input. Not surprisingly, since FK/FL is independent of vi, the least-cost combination of 
input does not depend on the degree of output market collusion among the firms. 
III. Handicapped Regulation, Employment, and Output 
We can now examine the effects of a tightened handicapped requirement (a higher k) on employ- 
ment and output. 
PROPOSITION I. For a given degree of collusion, the implementation of any handicapped 
regulation from an initial situation of no regulatory enforcement results in an increase in the 
equilibrium N*. Successively higher requirements may eventually lead to a reduction in equilibrium 
N*. 
The handicapped requirement has two offsetting effects on the derived demand for handi- 
capped workers. Firms substitute handicapped for non-handicapped workers to satisfy the regu- 
lation, while at the same time they substitute capital for the composite labor in response to the 
increased cost of the composite labor. For small increases in k from zero, the former always domi- 
dominant firm leadership. In this model, "the fringe" acts as a price taking firm so its conjectural variation is 1. The 
"dominant firm," on the other hand, can be shown to entertain a conjectural variation equal to es/[e - Of(1 - s)] where 
e is the price elasticity of market demand, s is the market share of the dominant firm, and Of is the conjectural own 
price elasticity of fringe supply (i.e. the dominant firm belief of how the fringe firms will change their output when the 
dominant firm changes its price). 
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nates. However, as k is increased further, the latter effect increases in importance, and dNi"*dk 
may turn negative. Nonetheless, the total response of handicapped employment to the implemen- 
tation of the requirement of any magnitude, from an initial situation of no requirement, must be 
positive. 
One important question is the extent o which the effectiveness ofhandicapped requirement 
depends on the degree of collusion among firms. To answer this question, we differentiate dN*/dk 
with respect to vi: 
a[dNi/dk]/avi < 0. 
Recalling that firm i becomes more collusive as vi becomes larger, we have: 
PROPOSITION II. The more collusive the industry, the less effective will be an increase in the 
handicapped requirement in raising handicapped employment. 
PROPOSITION III. 
(a) d(N + N*)/dk < 0, (7a) 
(b) dN/dk < 0, (7b) 
(c) sgn (dK/dk) = -(sgnFKL), and (7c) 
(d) sgn (dF/dk) = sgn (FLFKK - FKFKL). (7d) 
According to (a) and (b), a higher handicapped requirement would cause both total employ- 
ment and employment of non-handicapped labor to drop. According to (c) and (d), the effects of 
a higher handicapped requirement on capital usage and total output are ambiguous. 
Successive increases in the handicapped requirement raise the price of composite labor, 
which is used to determine derived labor demand. Thus, usage of composite labor must fall with 
increases in k because own price effects are necessarily negative for factor demands. It follows 
immediately that non-handicapped mployment, which accounts for a declining fraction of the 
ever-shrinking total, must also be a decreasing function of k. As the effective price of labor rises 
with k, the capital usage increases if capital and labor are substitutes in production (FKL < 0), 
but falls if they are complements (FKL > 0). Finally, output falls with increases in k unless labor 
is an inferior input, i.e., unless (FLFKK - FKFKL) > 0. In words, this condition is interpreted 
as requiring that the proportional decrease in the marginal physical products as a result of an 
increase in capital input be greater for labor than for capital. This possibility is precluded if labor 
and capital are complements in production. 
IV. Handicapped Regulation and Profits 
We turn now to the effects of handicapped regulation on a firm's profits. It is convenient, with no 
loss of generality, towork directly with the cost function C(q, k) of each firm. It is assumed that 
the two firms have identical cost functions, hence the subscripts are suppressed. As our interest is
in the dependence of these effects on the firm's ize, we will specifically address the issue: how 
will a small increase in the handicapped requirement affect he profits of firms when (1) their 
sizes are not equal, and (2) they have different degrees of economies of scale? 
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Unequal Firm Sizes 
Suppose that the market shares of these two firms are initially si qi/(qi + q2), i = 1, 2. The 
profit function of firm i is 
Hi = Pqi - C. (8) 
Totally differentiating (8) and substituting yields 
dHi = qidP + Cqdqi + qiviP'dqi - dC, (9) 
where Cq = aC/aqi and P' = dP/dQ. 
Using (9) and (5), it can be readily deduced for firm i that 
dHi/dk = {(P - Cq + QP')/[(1 + sivi)P'/si + viP" - Cqq]} - CkCqk, (10) 
where Cqq = cCq/cqi, P" = dP'/dQ, Ck = aC/ak, and Cqk = aCqlak. 
The second term on the right hand side of (10) is positive by assumption. It represents 
the direct effect of the shift in the profit function caused by an increase in the handicapped 
requirement. The first erm on the right hand side represents the indirect effect of the shift in the 
marginal profit function, which in turn changes the duopoly equilibrium. The denominator of the 
first erm is negative if stability is to hold,4 but the numerator can be of either sign. 
Several interesting results emerge. First, an increase in the handicapped requirement could 
increase the profits of the firm if the first erm is positive and large enough to swamp the second 
term. This is one of the most remarkable results in oligopoly theory in general and conjectural 
variation models in particular.5 
Second, and more surprisingly, an increase in the market share of a firm will make it less 
likely that he firm will benefit from an increase in k. Indeed, from equation (10) we can determine 
a critical market share above which a firm will be hurt by the handicapped requirement, and below 
which the handicapped requirement will raise the profits of the firm, ceteris paribus. That is, 
dlIi/dk > 0 if si < si*, 
where 
si = P'(Ck - qiCqk)/{Cqk(P - Cq) + Ck[Cqq - Vi(P' - P")p}. (11) 
Summing up, we find that he handicapped requirement may turn out to be discriminatory in 
favor of firms that have the smaller market shares. This surprising result, consistent with the JEC 
findings, has a fundamental connection with a similar esult in the theory of horizontal mergers. 
As Stigler [11] and others (e.g., Salant et al. [8]) have argued, firms which do not participate 
in a merger may benefit more than the participants. The reason is that the post-merger firm 
will typically reduce its production below the combined output of its constituent firms, causing 
industry price to rise. Nonparticipants will then expand output and profit under the umbrella of 
4. See Seade [9] for a thorough discussion of the stability condition. 
5. See Dixit [1], Katz and Rosen [3], Levin [4], and Stern [10]. 
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the higher industry price. Thus, merger participants do not capture all of the profits that result 
from a merger. A similar esult occurs in our model when, given industry structure, an exogenous 
change in costs resulting from the imposition of the handicapped requirement puts the large firms 
in a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis small firms.6 
Figure 1 illustrates the results. The cross-hatched area below AB contains the (vl, sl) com- 
binations necessary for firm 1 to benefit from an increase in k. Line AB corresponds to the initial 
value of k equal to zero. The higher the initial value of k is from zero, the greater will be the 
upward shift in the AB line, enlarging the (vl, sl) combinations necessary for firm 1 to benefit 
from an increase in k. Line CD is the counterpart of line AB for firm 2. Firm 2 will benefit from 
an increase in the handicapped requirement if (v2, S2) falls into the area to the southeast of CD. 
It is obvious from Figure 1 that several outcomes are possible: (1) one firm could lose and the 
other gain, (2) both firms could gain, or (3) both firms could lose. Nevertheless, for any degree 
of collusion, the smaller firms are more likely to gain. With enough collusion, and if both firms 
are similar in size, they may both gain from the regulatory requirement. 
Different Degrees of Economies of Scale 
The ability of firms to bear the regulatory costs should also presumably be affected by economies 
of scale. To focus on the effects of economies of scale of the industry, we assume that the two 
firms have equal market shares, si = s2 = 0.5. This restriction assumes that economies of scale 
depend only on industry output. Next, we define the elasticity of economies of scale to be 
0 = C/qiCq. (12) 
In general, 0 will be greater than unity, unity, or smaller than unity when there are economies 
of scale, no economies of scale, and diseconomies of scale, respectively. 
6. For a detailed analysis of the connection between conjectural variations and horizontal mergers, see Dung [2]. 
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Using (5), (9) and (12) we have: 
dHi/dk = {(P - 2C/QO + QP')/[(2 + vi)P' + viP" - Cqq]} - Ck/Cqk. (13) 
The result yielded by (13) is also counterintuitive. It says that he greater the degree of econo- 
mies of scale, the smaller the likelihood that a firm could perversely benefit from an increase 
in the handicapped requirement. An explanation of the result can be offered along the following 
lines. Because industry output declines as the handicapped requirement is increased, economies 
of scale lose some of their advantage. The greater the initial economies of scale, the more pro- 
nounced will be the loss of advantage following a tightening of the handicapped requirement, 
and the more likely the firm will be hurt by the handicapped requirement. Again, we can easily 
compute the critical value of 0, say 0", above which the handicapped requirement will lower the 
profits of the firm. Formally: 
dH/ldk >O if 0 < 0*", 
where 
0* = CqkC/{Cqk[P + QP"] - Ck[(2 + vi)P' + viP" - Cqq]}. (14) 
Figure 2 illustrates this case. Line MN (corresponding to some initial value of k) divides the 
(v, 6)-space into two areas: To the left (right) of this line are the (vi, 6) combinations that would 
allow the firm to gain (lose) from a small increase in k. Higher initial values of k will shift he 
MN line to the right. 
Summing up this section, we find that he handicapped requirement does discriminate among 
firms on the basis of size. The surprise is that smaller firms with no economies or even disecono- 
mies of scale are not necessarily the party worse off. 
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Table I. Critical Values of Market Share si (vi) 
vi k = 0 k = 5% k = 10% k = 15% k = 20% 
.000 3.125 3.145 3.165 3.185 3.205 
.100 3.049 3.067 3.086 3.106 3.125 
.200 2.976 2.994 3.012 3.030 3.049 
.300 2.907 2.924 2.941 2.959 2.976 
.400 2.841 2.857 2.874 2.890 2.907 
.500 2.778 2.793 2.809 2.825 2.841 
.600 2.717 2.732 2.747 2.762 2.778 
.700 2.660 2.674 2.688 2.703 2.717 
.800 2.604 2.618 2.632 2.646 2.660 
.900 2.551 2.564 2.577 2.591 2.604 
1.000 2.500 2.513 2.525 2.538 2.551 
1.100 2.451 2.463 2.475 2.488 2.500 
1.200 2.404 2.415 2.427 2.439 2.451 
1.300 2.358 2.370 2.381 2.392 2.404 
1.400 2.315 2.326 2.336 2.347 2.358 
1.500 2.273 2.283 2.294 2.304 2.315 
1.600 2.232 2.242 2.252 2.262 2.273 
1.700 2.193 2.203 2.212 2.222 2.232 
1.800 2.155 2.165 2.174 2.183 2.193 
1.900 2.119 2.128 2.137 2.146 2.155 
2.000 2.083 2.092 2.101 2.110 2.119 
V. Numerical Example 
To gain additional insights into the results, we conduct a numerical analysis using specific cost 
and demand functions. Following the well-established professional concensus,7 we employ linear 
demand and quadratic cost functions a first approximations of actual demand and cost conditions. 
Specifically, let 
C = (1 + k)q2 
and 
P = 20 - 8Q, 
where Q = qi + q2. 
Table I reports the values of si* computed from equation (11). Recall that v indicates the 
degree of collusion, which ranges from 0 (for perfect competition) to +2 (for perfect collusion); 
and k is the initial required ratio of handicapped workers to total employment. The body of the 
table gives the critical values of market share si* for the corresponding pair of (vi, ki). 
We note that in this example the critical market share for any combination (vi, ki) is not 
very large and is rather insensitive to the initial evel of the handicapped requirement (k). Of 
course, market share in the one to three percent range can represent sizeable annual sales for 
many government contractors. 
7. See, for instance, Katz and Rosen [3]. It must be noted, however, that he results we derived in previous sections 
are quite general. The specific functions are employed in this section as an example only. 
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Table II. Critical Values of Scale Economies 0*(vi) 
vi k = 0 k = 5% k = 10% k = 15% k = 20% 
.000 .02632 .02692 .02750 .02805 .02857 
.100 .02577 .02636 .02691 .02743 .02793 
.200 .02525 .02581 .02634 .02684 .02732 
.300 .02475 .02529 .02580 .02628 .02674 
.400 .02427 .02479 .02528 .02574 .02618 
.500 .02381 .02431 .02477 .02522 .02564 
.600 .02336 .02384 .02429 .02472 .02513 
.700 .02294 .02340 .02383 .02424 .02463 
.800 .02252 .02297 .02338 .02378 .02415 
.900 .02212 .02255 .02295 .02334 .02370 
1.000 .02174 .02215 .02254 .02291 .02326 
1.100 .02137 .02177 .02214 .02250 .02283 
1.200 .02101 .02139 .02176 .02210 .02242 
1.300 .02066 .02103 .02138 .02171 .02203 
1.400 .02033 .02069 .02102 .02134 .02165 
1.500 .02000 .02035 .02068 .02099 .02128 
1.600 .01969 .02002 .02034 .02064 .02092 
1.700 .01938 .01971 .02001 .02030 .02058 
1.800 .01908 .01940 .01970 .01998 .02024 
1.900 .01880 .01910 .01939 .01966 .01992 
2.000 .01852 .01882 .01910 .01936 .01961 
Using the same specific functions a in the previous case, we can also compute the critical 
degree of scale economies 0* as given by equation (14). The results are exhibited in Table II, 
which shows the critical value of the degree of economies of scale above which a tightening in k 
will lower firm profit. 
The most striking observation from Table II is that the firms need not have economies of 
scale to benefit from enforcement of the handicapped requirement. Evidently, for any given 
concentration ratio, economies of scale will have little ffect on whether a firm benefits or is hurt 
by the regulations. Of more importance is the degree of collusion among firms: the less collusive 
the firms, the higher will be the critical scale economies, i.e., the less likely that the firm will 
benefit from an increase in the handicapped requirement. In fact, this likelihood becomes stronger 
the higher the initial value of k. 
VI. Summary and Implications 
In this paper we used a conjectural variations model to analyze the effects of some stylized clauses 
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Some noteworthy conclusions were reached. 
First, because of input substitutability, an increase in the handicapped requirement (beyond a 
certain level) was shown to actually reduce total employment.8 Thus, administrative initiatives to 
tighten-up enforcement and get tough with violators may actually produce some counterproductive 
8. In a similar framework, Levin [3] discovered that taxation to control pollution could actually create more 
pollution in an oligopolistic industry. 
696 Tran Huu Dung and Robert Premus 
results. In any case, the analysis uggests that any regulatory efforts o create employment for the 
handicapped should consider focusing on the less collusive segment of the procurement market. 
This finding casts some doubt on the effectiveness of current practice whereby enforcement efforts 
appear to concentrate on the more oligopolistic industries. It must be reiterated, however, that 
when administrative and monitoring costs are taken into account, and especially when society has 
other goals, selective nforcement by concentrating on larger firms may be justified. 
Even if it succeeds in creating more jobs for handicapped workers, the socioeconomic re- 
quirement may increase industry extranormal profits as output and price are nudged closer to 
their cartel evels. Thus, instead of using its monopsony power to force firms in the procurement 
market o pay for socioeconomic programs, the government may in effect help these firms earn 
higher profits, thus passing on the cost of these programs to other sectors of the economy. 
Equally important, it is not necessarily true that smaller firms, or firms with diseconomies of 
scale, will suffer a loss in profits, absolutely or in comparison with larger firms. The outcome will 
depend on the degree of collusion in the industry. Specifically, small firms could see their profit 
margins increase by more than those of the large firms. Thus, the argument that "set asides" or 
special "regulatory relief" should be granted to small businesses to help them cope with various 
kinds of socioeconomic regulations should perhaps be justified on a case by case basis.9,10 
It is certainly not our contention that the Federal government should abandon its responsi- 
bility to the handicapped or in meeting any of the other social goals as expressed in procurement 
regulations. In view of our findings, however, a prudent policy would be to consider alternative 
means. For example, extending the "equal protection clause" of civil rights legislation to the 
handicapped population may be a more effective approach. Direct government assistance to help 
train and increase the employability of the handicapped also deserves more serious consideration. 
In this regard, the Technology-Related Assistance for Individuals With Disabilities Act of 1988, 
introduced in the House (HR.4904) and Senate (S.2561), holds great promise. Under the provi- 
sions of the proposed Act, the Federal government would assume some financial responsibility for 
the development and purchase of technology specifically designed to remove employment barriers 
for the handicapped. 
9. Needless to say, there may be other, better easons to help small businesses. 
10. See, e.g., Myles [5] for an analysis which incorporates a non-regulated sector. 
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